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1.  Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to explain Foreign Direct Investment of German 
enterprises. The theory of Foreign Direct Investment identifies a variety of 
location-specific, strategic, financial, as well as other motives which firms have in 
order to become multinationals.  
We apply the above theoretical schemata to the case of German enterprises 
and we also consider the evolution of German FDI in a historical context. The 
main conclusion of the research findings is that financial, strategic and location 
specific factors have been historically very influential in the decision of these 
firms to invest abroad. Thus both big businesses and SMEs invest mainly in 
Europe, with the US as the second-best location option.  
However, nowadays, there is a limited but essential trend that this may change. 
We argue that although historically location specific factors have been the most 
influential for FDI activity, in the current globalisation process German 
enterprises tend to shape their investment strategy on broader factors which 
influence core developments in the international economy. Thus the emergence of 
the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) emerging markets may change for ever 
the character of German FDI. If however this does not occur, the German industry 
may face, severe competitive pressures form its foreign rivals over the next years.    
 
2. Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The development of the subject in the last fifty years has bequeathed us 
with a plethora of theoretical explanations as regards the motives and 
determinants of FDI. At the heart of most of them lies the idea of market failure 
(Casson 1987), be it structural or transactional (Dunning & Rugman 1985). We 
may find it convenient to group the various theories of FDI under the following 
five approaches: The first one is the market power paradigm, stemming from the 
seminal work of Hymer (1960, published in 1976), which emphasises the 
oligopolistic and proprietary advantages, such as patents of all kinds, including 
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technology and product differentiation features, that firms try to exploit and/or 
defend by undertaking FDI (Caves 1971, 1974, 1996; Cowling & Sudgen 1987; 
Dunning 1974, 1981, 1993; Knickerbocker 1973). As mentioned earlier, the 
structural failure of oligopolistic competition at home provides the uninational 
firm with the motive to exploit its proprietary advantages abroad, by engaging in 
international production and, thus, becoming multinational. 
The second approach that of internalisation extends the work of Coase 
(1937) on the nature of the firm and argues that, in much the same way that we 
need firms to save on transactions costs, firms become multinational to increase 
efficiency. This is achieved by replacing external markets through internalising 
various functions. Firms which have already ownership advantages find it more 
profitable to use such advantages them than, say, license and/or franchise them to 
foreign locations. Using the market entails brokerage and contractual costs and is 
fraught with information and opportunistic behaviour and/or agency problems, in 
addition to losing out on possible tax advantages. Thus, by internalising 
production abroad, various costs of using the market are avoided. Consequently, 
the internalisation paradigm stresses that firms can save on transactions costs and 
raise efficiency (Buckley & Casson 1976; Rugman 1980). Under this approach, it 
is the transactional failure of external markets which forces firms to engage in 
FDI.  
The above two approaches lead to diametrically opposed welfare 
implications of the activities of multinationals. The market power paradigm 
implies that multinationals should be regulated to minimise the market failures 
they cause and, thus, their operations should be discouraged. On the other hand, 
the internalisation paradigm contends that multinationals are able to resolve 
transactional failures and to raise efficiency and, consequently, they should be 
encouraged (Pitelis & Sudgen 1991).  In an effort to bring together the two earlier 
competing approaches and to provide a general explanation of FDI, in a series of 
articles, Dunning (1977, 1979, 1981, 1988) has proposed and popularised his 
'eclectic theory' or OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalisation) paradigm. The 
theory synthesises various strands of economic thinking, such as industrial 
organisation, trade, location as well as internalisation and claims that the 
propensity of firms to engage in international production is a function of 
Ownership specific advantages, Locational advantages and Internalisation 
opportunities. As proposed by Dunning, the basic tenets of the 'eclectic theory' are 
that a firm will undertake international production if: (a) it possesses certain 
ownership advantages, which are exclusive or firm-specific proprietary rights, 
such as patents; (b) it is more beneficial to the firm to use such advantages itself 
than lease them to foreign firms, i.e., it pays the firm to internalise its activities 
through international production and (c) it must be profitable for the firm to utilise 
these advantages in conjunction with at least some factor inputs, including natural 
resources, outside its home market, otherwise foreign markets can be served by 
exports. The 'eclectic theory' contends that all kinds of FDI can be explained by 
reference to its conditions. However, the OLI paradigm, in its later versions, also 
recognises that advantages due to ownership, location and internalisation may 
change over time and accepts that if country-specific characteristics are important 
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determinants of FDI, it may be invalid to generalise from one country's experience 
to another. 
In addition to the aforementioned approaches, in a survey of theories of 
international production, Cantwell (1991) has also identified another two, namely, 
the competitive international industry approach and the macroeconomic 
development approach. The former, echoing Knickerbocker's oligopolistic 
reaction thesis, stresses that international production tends to be associated with 
rivalry amongst multinationals, which helps sustain the process of technological 
competition and development amongst them (Graham 1978, Cantwell 1989). The 
latter approach emphasises macroeconomic considerations, such as for example, 
trade and tariffs, as in the case of the Product Cycle Model (Vernon 1966, 1979); 
balance of payments issues (Hufbauer & Adler 1968); foreign trade and its effect 
on the development of the host country (Kozima 1978), who has put forward his 
Japanese-type, trade-oriented FDI; and the investment-development cycle 
(Dunning 1981, 1988), which contends that the level of inward and outward direct 
investment of countries is a function of their national level of development. 
However, as newly industrialised or industrialising countries are now undertaking 
outward FDI much earlier in their development, than it was the case before, 
Dunning's proposition may have to be qualified, than simply to extrapolate from 
one country's experience to another. The above theoretical schemata provide the 
following motives for FDI inflow:  
 
Financial motives  
 
-Exchange rate differentials between the home and host countries currencies make 
the investment preferable to the host country. (X1) 
-Access to cheaper loan capital between home host countries, essential for 
portfolio FDI (X2) 
 
Firm-strategic motives: 
 
-First mover advantage (X3) 
-The investment is a result of following a competitor from the domestic market 
(oligopolistic reaction) (X4) 
-The investment is part of a cost-leadership reaction (X5) 
-The investment is part of a product-differentiation strategy (X6) 
-The investment is part of a cost-focus strategy (X7) 
-The investment is part of differentiation-focus strategy (X8) 
-The investment is part of a geographical diversification strategy (X9) 
-Possession of better technology, compared to enterprises of host country (X10) 
-Superior entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities, compared to enterprises of 
host country (X11) 
 
 
Home- and host-country specific motives: 
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-High interest rates in native country render investment there unprofitable, so 
investing in these countries is a way to enhance our competitiveness in western 
markets (X12) 
-Exploitation of host country’s land and/or natural resources (X13) 
-Exploitation of host country’s infrastructure (X14) 
-Exploitation of specific human capital in the industrial sector of the enterprise in 
host country (X15) 
-Level and character of demand conditions of host country (X16) 
-The investment is the outcome of the desire to overcome trade barriers (tariffs, 
quotas etc.) imposed by host country (X17) 
 
  From the above it is obvious that when firms decide to expand their activities 
abroad they have a variety of motives. These may change from one industrial 
sector to another, thus enterprises in the financial industry may expand their 
activities abroad for totally different reasons when compared to labour or capital 
intensive enterprises. Furthermore, SMEs may expand for totally different reasons 
when compared to big businesses. We know turn our attention to the specific 
evolution of German FDI across time.    
 
 3. The Historical Evolution of German FDI (1900-2007).  
 
The German economic development started in 1871 after the re-unification 
of the various German states and principalities. Until 1914, Germany had become 
the most heavily industrialized country in Europe bypassing the UK, and was 
second, if not equal, to the USA in terms of industrial base and technological 
standards. The country in 1913 was producing the 90% of global production of 
dyes, the 30% of global production of pharmaceuticals, 35% of global production 
of electrical goods, 27% of chemicals, 29% of machinery and 17% of internal 
combustion engines.i The current section is divided between two main periods. 
The first one refers to the 1900-1945 period, when German FDI was influenced by 
political factors and from the economic doctrine of the “Grossraumwirtschaft” 
(=The Great Economic Zone). Under this doctrine, the German companies should 
primarily expand to areas which are rich in natural resources and raw materials. 
Both were desperately needed, from the advanced German industry, which could 
transform them to final industrial products of high added value.     
      
3a. The 1900-1945 Period 
 
The exact amount of German FDI before 1914 is still an issue of debate 
since different sources provide conflicting, and up to a point contradictory, 
information about the level of German foreign investments. According to one 
source, in 1913 the total FDI of Britain was £793 m. The total FDI of France was 
£357 m. Germany was in the third place with total FDI valued at £230 m. Finally 
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the total FDI of the US was just £139 m.i Contrary to the above evidence Dunning 
(1993) provides the following figures for 1914: The total British FDI was $6,500 
m. (44.6% of global FDI at the time). Total US FDI was worth of $2,652 m. 
(18.6% of the global FDI at the time). The French was in the third place with total 
FDI of $1,750 m. (just 12% of global FDI at the time). Finally, Germany was in 
the fourth place with total FDI worth of $1,500 m. (just 10.3% of the global FDI 
at the time).ii   Another source provides the following estimates: Total global FDI 
in 1914 was $45.4 billion. From that amount Britain had the biggest share (44%), 
followed by France with 19.9%, Germany with 12.8%, US with 7.8% and Holland 
with just 2.6%.iii Finally, according to one source, the geographical distribution of 
FDI from the main European economies, in 1914, was as follows: 47% of British 
FDI was invested in various colonies, protectorates and dominions of the Empire. 
The US and Latin America have absorbed another important, and equal share 
(20% each). Finally Europe had absorbed a modest 6% of total British FDI. The 
rest of the world had absorbed the remaining 7%.           
French FDI was mainly European concentrated (61%). The French 
colonies have absorbed just 9%. Latin America had absorbed 15% of French FDI. 
Two semi-autonomous African states (Egypt and South Africa) had absorbed 7%. 
The whole of Asian continent and the rest of the world had absorbed just 5% each.  
Finally German FDI was predominantly European focused as well. Thus 53% of 
German FDI was in European countries. The US and Canada had absorbed the 
16% of German investments. An equal share was absorbed by Latin America. 
Africa had absorbed 9% of total German FDI, whereas Asia had just 5% of total 
German FDI at the time.iv The end of the First World War in 1918 had perished 
German FDI across countries. All German foreign assets were confiscated by the 
Allies and most of them were sold in order to provide cash which was desperately 
needed for the reparations which Germany had to meet with the Versailles Treaty.  
However during the interwar years (1919-1939) German enterprises 
started gradually but steadily to re-appear as foreign investors, in spite of the 
volatile domestic economic environment (hyperinflation of 1923) as well as the 
economic crisis due to the 1929 crash.   According to one source the total global 
FDI IN 1938 was $54,950 m. and was distributed as follows: Great Britain had the 
highest share (41.7%), followed by the US (21.2%). Holland was in the third 
place (8.7%) and France in the fourth (7%). The fifth place was occupied by Japan 
(2.8%), the sixth by Soviet Russia (1.7%). Germany was seventh with just 1.3% 
of total global FDI.v Although globally the presence of German multinationals 
was very weak in 1938-1939, this was not the case for the countries of South-
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Eastern and Eastern Europe. Germany had a strong presence in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria (which were both annexed to the Third Reich), Greece, 
Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Το illustrate, in 1938 the German investments in 
Βulgaria, Roumania, Greece and Yugoslavia were $134.7 m. The French FDI 
were $292.1 m. and the British were $571.4 m.  To provide just one example, 
chrome production in Yugoslavia increased from 76,779 tons in 1936, to 96,716 
tons in 1937, to 103,197 tons in 1938. This immense increase occurred due to 
German FDI which increased from 1% of total FDI in 1937 to 20% οf total FDI in 
1940. i   Just the steel industry “Krupp” invested in the chrome industry of 
Yugoslavia RM 500,000 alone. Furthermore, Krupp in association with other 
German industries such as the “Reichswerke Hermann Goring” and the “Berlin & 
Salzgitter” made immense investments in other resources of the country, which 
put under German control the “Jeserina” and the “Yugochrome” mines. 
Furthermore, the “Deutsche Bank” in association with the Austrian “Credit-
Anstalt Bank”, established the “Lozovac Mines”. In addition German and Swiss 
enterprises established in 1936 the “Montania AG” in the Zajaca territory. Other 
German factories were made in the provinces of Olov, Srebrenica and Lisa, and 
by 1940, almost the total Yugoslav production of antimony was under German 
control.  
During the Second World War (1939-1945) the development of German 
FDI was immense especially in Europe. The early German victories (1939-1942) 
resulted in the occupation of Western, South-Eastern Europe as well as huge parts 
of the USSR. The outcome was that German enterprises followed the armies and 
controlled most of raw materials and resources of the occupied Europe. Pool 
(1997) points out that Alfred Krupp acquired the best industries in Ukraine. (the 
huge Molotov industrial complex, one of the biggest steel industries in Europe 
and also two of the most modern machine tools industries in the world the Azova 
and the Ilyitch factories). Any factory or its equipment which the Germans 
believed to be old or outdated was simply destroyed. Also the mines of the 
Ukraine were exploited. However, the fact that during 1943-1945 the war took a 
reverse negative trend for Germany, affected both German FDI as well as German 
industries in the homeland, which, had to cope with the allied strategic air 
offensive from British and US bombers. By 1945 German FDI has seized to exist 
and also this time the home country enterprises had lost most of their assets. 
 
3b. The 1945-2007 Period 
 
The first decade after the Second World War (1945-1955) was a period of 
revival for the German economy. The new West German state has made its initial 
economic recovery during the 1950-1955 period. Thus GNP increased from DM 
98 billion in 1950 to 181 billion in 1955. Private savings increased from DM 2 
billion to DM 7 billion over the same period. Also by 1955 there was a surplus in 
the trade balance (DM 25,7 billion of exports, DM 24,5 billion of imports). By the 
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1970s the (West) German economy was the second largest in the capitalist world 
and again it was the biggest economy in Europe. This was the period of the export 
oriented “Wirtschaftswunder” (=economic miracle). For reasons of comparison 
the economy of the former East German state (GDR) was the second largest in the 
socialist block behind the USSR.i  During this period (1955-1975) the revival of 
German international business took place. Thus German multinationals started to 
operate abroad once again. However Europe was again the most preferable 
location for foreign activities, just like the past. To illustrate, in 1977, total 
German FDI was DM 52.1 billion. From the above amount the DM 17.8 billion 
(34.1%) were invested in Western Europe (EEC of the time, thus excluding FDI 
in south and south-eastern Europe, i.e Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and 
Switzerland). In the US total FDI was DM 6.7 billion (12.8%). The other essential 
locations were Canada with DM 3.58 billion (6.8%), and Brazil with DM 4.03 
billion (7.7%).ii In the 1980s, total German FDI increased rapidly, but Europe 
remained the most preferable location. Table 1 illustrates the above point.  
 
TABLE 1: GERMAN FDI 1980-1989 (in billion DM and %) (*) 
 1980 1981 1982 1988 1989 
Total FDI 84.4 
(100%) 
101.9 
(100%) 
109 
(100%) 
185.4 
(100%) 
206.8 
(100%) 
Europe  41.3 
(49%) 
44.9 
(44.1%) 
45.9 
(42.1%) 
91.1 
(49.1%) 
104.5 
(50.5%) 
EEC 28.6 
(33.9%) 
30.4 
(29.8%) 
31.9 
(29.3%) 
72.9 
(39.3%) 
85.4 
(41.3%) 
Latin 
America  
10.1 
(12%) 
12.1 
(11.9%) 
12.7 
(11.7%) 
15.7 
(8.5%) 
14.7 
(7.1%) 
Africa 2.4 
(2.9%) 
3.1 
(3.1%) 
3.6 
(3.3%) 
3.07 
(1.7%) 
2.7 
(1.3%) 
Asia-
Oceania 
3.5 
(4.2%) 
4.6 
(4.6%) 
5.0 
(4.6%) 
11.0 
(5.9%) 
11.6 
(5.6%) 
USA 18.2 
(21.6%) 
25.7 
(25.2%) 
28.0 
(25.7%) 
50.6 
(27.3%) 
56.2 
(27.2%) 
Source: A. Georgopoulos: “Modern Trends of Internationalization of Commercial, 
Productive and Financial Relations”, Athens Papazisis editions, 1988, (in Greek), 
pages: 168-171. (*)=rounded numbers, for exact data and full list of host countries 
see the above reference.  
 
The data of Table 1 demonstrate that throughout the 1980s the most 
preferable location for German FDI was Europe. The total European share was 
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between 42%-50.5% of total FDI. The US was the second-best location absorbing 
between 21.6%-27.3% of German FDI. The above trend continued in the 1990s as 
well. To illustrate, total German FDI in 1993 was DM 319.4 billion. From the 
above amount DM 188.3 billion (58.9%) were invested in Europe, and DM 153.2 
billion were invested in the EEC (48%). Latin America had absorbed DM 21.8 
billion (6.9%), Africa had absorbed DM 3.9 billion (1.3%), Asia and Oceania 
absorbed DM 16.4 billion (6.1%), the USA had absorbed DM 76.4 billion 
(23.9%).i       
In the late 1990s, 60% of the German investments were (still) increasingly 
in Europe, particularly in Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, 
an increased movement towards Eastern Europe such as Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland has also been recognised. Countries such as North America 
had a slightly decreased trend from 33% down to 27% (1985) and Latin America 
also from 9% to 5%. During that time 5% was invested in the Asian market with 
main receiver Japan (30%), Singapore (12%) and China with 1/5 of the total 
investments. ii  In 1995, more than half of the German FDI was done in the EU 
and more than 1/5 in the USA. In countries such as East Asia and Eastern 
European countries Germany was underrepresented.  At the end of 1999 German 
primary direct investment abroad summed up to a total € 392 billion which 
indicates an increase of four times within ten years. German investments in 
industrial countries accounted for 84%. A large part, € 180 billion, of these capital 
links was accounted for by EU countries. Main investment destinations were the 
United Kingdom (€ 40 billion), France (€ 23 billion) and the Netherlands (€ 21 
billion). An additional sum of € 20 billion, were invested in the EU accession 
countries. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were amongst the leading 
countries. € 25 billion; this was only 6% of the total outward FDI of German 
companies.  
China deserves special attention with over € 4 billion of direct investment 
from Germany. Investment in Russia remained restrained on account of the 
difficult political situation. German firms had direct investments in developing 
countries totalling of € 39 billion. This was less than 10% of their total outward 
FDI. African developing countries received less than 1/10. German FDI in (Latin) 
America developing countries was far larger. To illustrate, investments in Brazil 
were € 7 billion and in Mexico € 5 billion. Almost half of the direct investment 
enterprises in developing countries in which German investors were involved 
were located in Asia (including Oceania); the volume of funds invested in the 
region was € 14 billion at the end of 1999. This indicates at low wage rates 
encourage labour-intensive production methods. 
At that time 8,304 German investors were registered abroad. By analysing 
the investment volume it becomes clear that the ten largest investors held 1/3 (€ 
137 billion) of all German direct investment abroad. The 50 largest individual 
investors accounted for more than 1/2 (€ 230 billion) of the total. The 100 biggest 
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investors between them made up no less than 2/3 of the aggregate volume of 
investment in foreign enterprises. In terms of the size of the individual corporate 
investments abroad, large scale investments played a significant role. The ten 
largest direct investment enterprises abroad accounted for 1/6 of German firms’ 
aggregate FDI, the 50 largest projects made up 30%, while the 100 largest 
investment projects had a share of almost 2/5, or € 157 billion, in total outward 
FDI of German companies. More than 70% of German FDI abroad was accounted 
for by direct investment enterprises which were wholly owned by German 
companies; similarly, 2/3 of all direct investment enterprises were 100% German 
owned. A further 14% of the outward FDI stock (and 20% of the direct 
investment enterprises) had a German participation of between 50% and 100%. 
Only 1/7 of all cases (and roughly the same proportion of total German direct 
investment abroad) related to German minority interests in foreign direct 
investment enterprises, defined as at least 10% of the capital shares or voting 
rights. i At the end of 1999 almost 2/3 (€ 100 billion) of the total FDI of German 
manufacturers (€ 158 billion) was invested in foreign industrial enterprises. A 
further € 23 billion was invested in distribution outlets, which are far less capital-
intensive, and € 26 billion was invested in “other financial intermediaries”. There 
were differences in the sectoral profile of the corporate assets in the EU region 
held by German investors. Most preferred sector in the UK, Belgium and 
Luxembourg was the financial industry. In Austria, France and Spain direct 
investments in the manufacturing or wholesale/retail trade sectors played an 
important role. At the end of 2002, the stock of German direct investment abroad 
was €651 billion. But by looking at the German investments it becomes clear that 
actually a big part of the investments 86% are made in other industrial nations—
mainly western Europe (45%) and the U.S. (37%)—just 7% is in eastern Europe, 
and less than 1% is in China. Thus Europe remains the preferable location. Inside 
Europe, in 2002 main receivers of investments were the UK. But countries such as 
Romania, Bulgaria and EU accession countries indicated a fast growing potential. 
In 2002 Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states received numerous 
projects from German and Japanese automotive, electronics and machinery 
sectors. ii  The above trend continued during the 2004-2007 period as Table 2 
indicates.  
 
 
 
TABLE 2: GERMAN FDI 2004-2007 (in billion € and %) (*) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total FDI 78.3 
(100%) 
91.5 
(100%) 
109.3 
(100%) 
162.5 
(100%) 
Europe  55.3 72.6 80.7 130.2 
                                                 
i
 Structure of German firms’ international capital links at end-1999 Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report April 2001, for all the data above.   
ii
 See: http://www.locate-in-europe.com/inv_trends.htm 
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(70.6%) (79.3%) (73.8%) (80.1%) 
EEC (27) 53.4 
(68.1%) 
65.4 
(71.4%) 
75.1 
(68.7%) 
108.9 
(67%) 
Latin America  2.5 
(3.1%) 
1.6 
(1.7%) 
1.5 
(1.3%) 
4.9 
(3%) 
Africa 1.5 
(1.9%) 
1.8 
(1.9%) 
2.8 
(2.5%) 
1.6 
(1%) 
Asia-Oceania 5.7 
(7.2%) 
3.5 
(3.8%) 
3.8 
(3.4%) 
6.8 
(4%) 
USA 12.1 
(15.4%) 
9.4 
(10.2%) 
19.6 
(17.9%) 
17.8 
(11%) 
Source: Direktinvestitionen International, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik, various issues, 
republished by Deutsche Bundesbank. (*)=The data refer to new annual 
investments, without taking into consideration former investment projects or any 
disinvestment.  
 
The data of Table 2 demonstrate that the trend of choosing Europe as the 
primary location for FDI, remains dominant until nowadays. Thus in 2007 the 
astonishing amount of 80% of German FDI was located in Europe (from that 
amount the 67% was in other EU countries). The remaining 20% of German FDI 
was spread across the globe, with the US absorbing 11%. Asia as well as Oceania 
absorbed only a small fraction of just 4%.            
 
4. Motives for German FDI and Entry Modes  
 
From the above presentation it is obvious that for more of a century 
German FDI demonstrated a unique location consistency. German enterprises 
constantly favour Europe, compared to other markets of the world as their primary 
location of activity. In terms of locations and types of investment, these are best 
captured by Map 1 which demonstrates the types of German FDI across Europe 
during the 2003-2004 period.      
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MAP 1: Key Investment Regions of German FDI according 
to activity (2003-2004) 
 
Source: www.ey.com.global/download.nsf/ (data retrieved 22-07-2008).  
 
Why Europe has been so important to German industries across time? 
What are the motives behind the above decision? Furthermore, what entry modes 
German multinationals choose in order to penetrate foreign markets?  In order to 
answer the above questions we have to take into consideration some special 
characteristics of German business and industry. These are as follows:    
 
4a. Characteristics of German Business 
 
The first important industrial characteristic is associated with the presence 
of a large number of SMEs which are also very successful in the domestic as well 
as international economy. These “Mittelstand” SMEs are the backbone of the 
economy. Their number is around 3.3 million and their employment rate lies at 
70% of the total labour force. Almost 2/3 of all German SMEs is 75% owned by 
the manager or the head of the company. Thus the old family firm (U-firm) where 
ownership and control is not separated is still present in the German economy. 
The minimum annual turnover of such company was around € 125,000 (2004 
data). However under the current globalised economy these “Mittelstand” SMEs 
face severe economic pressure which made many of them insolvent or even forced 
them to engage in international production and thus move to Eastern European 
countries which by 2004 entered the EU (mainly Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
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Poland).i Thus these firms can continue to compete by reducing labour costs, since 
they do not have the ability for high R&D which could provide new products or 
innovative production techniques. Thus for these firms the engagement in short 
distance FDI (many times just cross-border activity) is a way to remain alive in 
the current globalized environment.     
The second important characteristic of German business is that it is 
characterized by the presence of big businesses which became legends of success 
in various industries of the international economy, such as: automobiles [Daimler-
Benz, Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW), Volkswagen], chemicals 
[Baddische Annilin und Soda Fabrik (BASF), Bayer, Hoechst] electronics [Bosch, 
Siemens, Grundig] banks [Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Disconto-
Gessellschaft], mechanical engineering [Krupp-Thyssen], energy [E.ON, RWE 
(Rheinisch Westfälische Elektrizitätswerk AG)]. These big businesses from the 
early years have created new managerial structures (M-form enterprises) and 
achieved economies of scale and scope.ii  
However, the problem which German big business faces is that they are 
practically operating in declining industries. The Germans are still leaders but in 
wrong economic activities. Cars, chemicals, machine tools and electronics were 
the industries of the second industrial revolution (i.e. the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries). The 21st century and the new globalised environment is a 
completely different phenomenon with different economic characteristics, 
consumer needs, and competitive challenges. Micro-electronics, semiconductors, 
artificial intelligence, environmentally clean and friendly products, ICT business 
as well as infrastructure and e-commerce (B-B / B-C / C-B) are the current infant, 
but future industries, as well as products. Gradually but steadily, technology is 
making the capital intensive industries of the era of industrial revolution declining. 
German firms have invested millions in traditional these industries (cars, 
chemicals, electronics, machinery) and in high cost locations facing nowadays 
enormous exit barriers. Furthermore the problem becomes bigger if we consider 
that these declining industries can nowadays assemble if not produce their 
products, in the low labor cost countries of South East Asia (Tigers) as well as in 
the new emerging economies of China and India.                                  
                                                 
i
 See: Statistiches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/insoltab1.htm and Sinn, H.W. (2003): 
“Ist Deutschland noch zu retten? ”, Econ, Germany, page 411.   
ii
 For the development as well as characteristics of big business in Germany see: 1) Youssef 
Cassis: “Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century”, Oxford University 
Press, 1999, pages: 24-27, 46-54, 78-101 (for comparative analysis with French and British 
companies), 2) Wilfried Feldenkirchen: “Germany: The Invention of Interventionism”, in the 
volume: J. Foreman-Peck & G. Federico (eds.): “European Industrial Policy. The Twentieth 
Century Experience”, Oxford University Press, 1999, pages 98-123, 3) A.D. Chandler: “Scale and 
Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism”, Harvard University Press, 1990, pages: 393-592. 
For selected case studies see also: Lothar Gall & Gerald D. Feldman & Harold James & Carl 
Ludwig Holtfrerich & Hans E. Büschgen: “The Deutsche Bank 1870-1995”, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London, 1995 and Werner Abelshauser & Wolfgang von Hippel & Jeffrey Allan 
Johnson & Raymond G. Stokes: “German Industry and Global Enterprise: BASF: The History of 
A Company”, Cambridge University Press, 2004.    
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German investors, both of SMEs as well as the big businesses, were 
affected by the structural problems of German production. Therefore they felt 
forced to continue production in Germany. As result other locations in other 
countries became more competitive. German investors had to face in addition to 
the high labour costs, a high level of subsidisation, and a strong currency, the 
costs of the unification. The main motives for German FDI in Europe can be 
grouped in three main categories and are as follows:  
 
4b. Motives for FDI 
 
The motives for FDI can be identified across the types that we have 
already mentioned. Thus out of the set of 17 different motives which we pointed 
out in the previous theoretical section at least three main sets apply, for different 
types of firms and industries. These refer to motives X5, X7, X14, X15, X16, X10, X11, 
X1. 
 
   
4b1. Cost leadership and cost-focus strategies associated with level and 
character of demand conditions of host country and exploitation of specific 
human capital in the industrial sector of the enterprise in host country and 
local infrastructure 
Even before unification, German investors had already started moving 
their production facilities to countries such as Spain and Portugal where labour 
costs were lower, also to the USA. German efficiency, thoroughness, and quality 
control could only compensate up to a point for the cost advantage that producers 
in other countries increasingly enjoyed.  
Under the current globalization constraints reduction of labour costs is a 
primary target for both SMEs as well as big businesses. The total hourly labour 
costs in the (West) German manufacturing sector were EUR 26.36, which is equal 
to 28% that is above the average for the 20 industrialised countries in 2002. In 
eastern Germany, total hourly labour costs of EUR 16.43 in 2002.i The following 
table provides an overview of labour costs in EU and other western countries. 
 
TABLE 3: LABOUR COSTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Hourly labour costs in the manufacturing sector in selected countries. 2002 (in €) 
. Labour costs  Hourly wages  Non-wage labour costs  
Norway 28.52 19.20 9.31 
Western Germany 26.36 14.74 11.62 
Switzerland 26.24 17.20 9.03 
Denmark 25.73 19.64 6.09 
Belgium 23.35 12.22 11.12 
Finland 23.20 13.05 10.15 
                                                 
i
 http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/10/inbrief/de0310101n.html 
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Netherlands 22.64 12.63 10.01 
USA 22.44 16.18 6.26 
Sweden 21.86 12.90 8.97 
Austria 21.64 11.19 10.45 
Japan 20.18 12.06 8.12 
UK 19.89 13.76 6.14 
Luxembourg 19.67 13.03 6.64 
France 19.50 10.20 9.30 
Canada 17.44 12.58 4.86 
Ireland 17.17 12.29 4.88 
Italy 16.60 8.53 8.08 
Eastern Germany 16.43 9.96 6.47 
Spain 15.37 8.42 6.96 
Greece 9.47 5.64 3.82 
Portugal 6.59 3.74 2.84 
Source: Cologne Institute for Business Research (IW), 2003.  
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2003/10/inbrief/de0310101n.html 
   
The data of Table 3 demonstrate the problem of German multinationals, at least 
those operating in big businesses. Big business such as banking, car 
manufacturing, chemicals, electronics, are associated with skilled labour force as 
well as advanced related and supporting industries. These production factors and 
inputs could be found mainly in the advanced countries of Western Europe and 
the USA for many decades.       
When German multinationals (MNEs) made the necessary (massive) 
investments to these countries, were obviously creating high exit barriers as well 
in the above locations, which, nowadays, do not possess any more competitive 
advantages. Thus investments by car manufacturers or electronic firms in the US 
or Japan, which were sensible in the 1980s, are not any more, due to the 
emergence of similar producers in China, India or even Brazil.    
Furthermore, the level and character of demand conditions of host country (in this 
case Western Europe and the US) were ideal for the high quality products of 
German industries. Thus the high income West European or American consumer 
was able to purchase the expensive German brands (cars, electrical appliances etc), 
again an essential motive for German big business MNEs to operate in these 
markets.      
For the big business obviously nowadays countries such as Poland, the 
Czech Republic and China show dynamic growth markets therefore they are being 
preferred by companies. Market growth, the ability to achieve a leading market 
position and political and economic stability in the host country are traits of the 
emerging markets.  
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The preference to the above high labour cost regions can be explained by 
other advantages which used to offset the above weakness. Thus the skilled labour 
force of Western Europe and the US was needed for the production of the highly 
advanced German products. Furthermore the high income consumer of the US as 
well as Western Europe was also needed in order to absorb the luxury branded 
German goods. Finally cheap raw materials could be obtained from south and 
south-eastern Europe.          
The SMEs, on the other hand, which as noted earlier, almost exclusively 
follow a cost-focus or cost-leadership strategy, will have to select the low cost 
countries of Eastern Europe as their ideal locations, since at this case, 
transportation and monitoring-transaction costs are also very limited.       
   
4b2. Possession of better technology, compared to enterprises of host country 
and superior entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities, compared to 
enterprises of host country  
 
The firm-specific advantages which German firms enjoy over other 
European firms have been obvious already in the 1970s. To illustrate, in 1972 
German share contribution to R&D expenditure in Europe was 47.3%, followed 
by France (40%), Italy (7.5%), Belgium (3.1%), Holland (2.1%). In 1977 the 
shares were as follows: Germany: 36.2%, France: 26.1%, UK: 20.8%, Holland: 
6.4%, Italy: 5.3%, Belgium: 3.5%, Denmark: 1.4% and Ireland: 0.3%. The leading 
industrial position on R&D continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, productivity levels between Germany and the other industrial 
nations have changed to Germany’s favour. To illustrate in 1950 the productivity 
levels were as follows: USA=100, UK=56, Germany=33. In 1973 the indexes 
were: USA=100, UK=64, Germany=71. In 1989 they were: USA=100, 
Germany=82, UK=78.     
 
4b3. Financial and foreign exchange motives for German FDI 
 
The final set of factors which explain German FDI is the strength of the 
German currency compared to other foreign currencies. To illustrate under the 
initial fixed exchange rate regime of the Bretton Woods system the initial rate 
between the $ and the DM was $1=4.20 DM. However, in March 1961, the DM 
was overvalued to the $ by 4.76%. This initial overvaluation was reflected in the 
exchange rates of the DM with the other European currencies as well. In the 
1970s the two oil crises created huge volatility in the foreign exchange markets 
(FX), however by between 1972-1976 the DM was overvalued against the US$ by 
32%, against the FF by 29%, against the British £ by 76% and by the Italian lire 
(IL) by 91%.i The strong DM allowed the German firms to acquire cheaply all 
kinds of assets across Western Europe and the USA. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
German firms had to meet the competitive pressure, which accrue from Japanese 
                                                 
i
 See: Gerhard Kade: “The German Challenge”, Livanis editions, Athens, 1981, pages 42, 65 and 
68. (Greek edition).  
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MNEs. It was the 1980s which created the first essential change in the post war 
international economy. Japan in the end of the 1980s, was the second biggest 
western economy and for the first time the German economy became the third 
largest in the western world (still the largest in Europe). At the end of the 1980s 
the Japanese FDI was higher than the German, however in the 1990s it was 
evident that certain investments of the Japanese MNEs, were too risky, compared 
to the ones of the German MNEs. This was evident especially by the end of the 
decade with the Asian crisis (1997-1999 period).                   
 
4c. Modes of Entry  
 
Entry strategies differ across regions. Strategic alliances and joint ventures 
are preferred for entering the Asian market. To enter the eastern European market 
acquisitions are preferred, by German MNEs. Furthermore, German industrial 
companies follow some distinct globalisation strategies. To illustrate, automotive 
component suppliers and firms that make special machinery and industrial 
systems serve the world's key markets from local production and sales hubs, 
primarily in Asia and North and South America. Special machinery and industrial 
systems manufacturers and also automotive component suppliers and electronics 
firms examine cost and quality criteria to determine the best location for every 
corporate function. Then they establish an efficient global network and maintain a 
genuinely global footprint. Many companies in the electrical engineering industry 
transfer labour-intensive activities in the production process to low-wage regions 
such as Eastern Europe and Asia. This last group manufacture in Germany and 
use this as the base from which they serve global customers. Many of these firms 
produce technology-intensive machinery or operate highly automated, capital-
intensive plant.i Thus it is obvious that big businesses have no other option. They 
have to reduce production costs by exploiting the low cost labour of the emerging 
markets and thus by establishing assembly lines throughout them. On the other 
hand the R&D facilities will have to remain either in the home country (Germany) 
or in other part(s) of the developed world (Western Europe, Japan, USA).   
 
5. German FDI in BRIC countries and selected case studies.  
 
We have already pointed out that for more than a century German FDI is 
concentrated mainly in Europe; the US follows as the second best location. We 
have pointed out that the above trend can be analysed by economic theory as 
follows: The German industries historically produced advanced products in the 
electrical, chemical and mechanical engineering industries. In order to produce the 
above products skilled labour force, associated with other related traits is needed 
(infrastructure, low level of bureaucratic barriers, low taxation etc). Furthermore, 
the above products could be absorbed by high income consumers, which could be 
found in western European states and in the US.         
                                                 
i
 See the following internet address: http://www.rolandberger.com/press/en/html/releases/514-
press_archive2004_sc_content/pr74.html 
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However, the twenty-first century may change the above trend. The new 
emerging BRIC markets possess huge economic advantages. To begin with, 
Brazil, the country is an important market with 190 million population. In terms 
of GNP the country, expressed at PPP this has reached the $1.8 trillion, thus 
putting the country in the eighth place of world ranking.  
Russia in the end of 2007 has recorded a total GNP of $1.3 trillion, 6.4 
times higher than 1999, putting the country in the eleventh place of world ranking.  
India, one the other hand, has recorded a GNP of $1.25 trillion and an 
annual growth rate of 9-10%. Finally China has experienced in the 1990s an 
equally high annual growth rate and in 2004 the country’s GNP expressed in PPP 
terms was the second in the world ($7.1 trillion). All the above states have high 
growth rates, big domestic markets, rapidly increased per capita income, a 
developing trend in new industries (artificial intelligence, computers etc.). 
Furthermore, low labour cost is associated with increasingly skilled and 
disciplined labour. Obviously the BRIC countries still have many barriers such as 
bureaucracy, high foreign exchange risk, due to the volatility of local currencies, 
political instability, inadequate infrastructure etc. However, in the long run the 
disadvantages will diminish and thus under a cost-benefit analysis the FDI will be 
associated with higher benefit than cost. Thus, the German firms have not 
benefited as much as the enterprises of other EU countries due to their strategy of 
focusing mainly in Europe. This is illustrated in Table 4.              
 
TABLE 4: German FDI in BRIC countries viz. a viz. other EU countries 
2004-2007 (in m. €) 
Country Brazil 
2004-7 
average 
Brazil 
2007 
Russia 
2004-7 
average 
Russia 
2007 
India 
2004-7 
average 
India 
2007 
China 
2004-7 
average 
China 
2007 
Belgium 336 -139 * 403 958 33 28 68 369 
Germany 1,073 1,147 2,189 6,698 864 1,719 2,712 2,246 
Spain 2,013 2,467 127 81 n/a 90 n/a 783 
France 910 1,085 569 603 255 316 1,179 1,751 
Italy 160 160 33 19 39 35 251 394 
UK 529 956 n/a n/a 572 567 4,659 3,437 
EU-27 6,404 7,143 10,844 17,106 4,376 10,947 10,454 7,780 
Source: Eurostat Statistics, No.64 / 2008, page 4. *=disinvestment  
 
The data of Table 4 demonstrate total EU FDI inflows to BRIC countries 
and also selected data by the major European investors. The above data 
demonstrate that in three out of four countries (Brazil, Russia, India), German 
enterprises have been the main investors. However, for the case of China it is the 
British multinationals which have invested heavily and possess the top place. 
Taking into consideration that Russia is mainly a European country it is obvious 
that the trend of the German enterprises is explained since these investments are 
under the “European net”. Although for the 2004-2007 period total German FDI 
to China is higher compared to Russia the data for 2007 demonstrate a different 
evolution. If this trend continues in the following years is still unknown, however, 
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if it is going to be continued, it will certainly marginalize the other BRIC 
countries in favour of the “European” Russia.           
In order to cement our argument we shall provide evidence of FDI which 
is composed by case-study approaches, across industries. The cases of German 
firms illustrate the preference to the previous specific investment locations and to 
the previous motives for FDI as well as to the modes of entry which we have 
described in the previous paragraph. We consider three cases studies which 
represent the main industrial sectors of the German economy. Thus we consider: 1) 
The electronic industry, 2) The automobile industry, 3) The chemical industry. 
Due to limitations of space we have to be brief. 
In the electronic industry the sector is dominated by two enterprises. These 
are Siemens and Bosch. At the beginning of 2004, the Bosch Group had 
approximately 232,000 associates, more than half of which were outside Germany. 
The company has around 258 subsidiaries and associated companies in over 50 
countries. A total of 249 manufacturing sites, 185 of which are located outside 
Germany, support the international activities. i  As of 2005 the company has 
facilities at 57 locations with 111,000 employees in Germany and worldwide at 
236 locations with 243,000 employees. More than 10,000 employees are in China. 
In 2004 the sales was about €40 billion worldwide while in 2003 it was €36.4 
billion.ii Only for the automotive branch the company’s sales were € 25.3 billion 
in 2004. The automotive operations of the company contributed 63.25% of 
Bosch's 2004 sales. In 2003 they were 64.8%. About 71% of the company's 2004 
sales were generated outside of Germany, consistent with sales in 2003.iii Bosch 
has been making investments in new facilities and expanding existing sites within 
Europe and in a growing number in America and Asia.  
 
Bosch Group sales by region in 2004 
 
Source: http://www.bosch.com/content/language2/html/2241.htm 
 
                                                 
i
 See the following internet address: http://www.bosch-presse.de/TBWebDB/en-
US/PressText.cfm?CFID=155637&CFTOKEN=92a8dda7b9f8a84f-75610834-F2DB-EEB7-
DAAAB1AFB25AF15B&Search=1&id=1902 
ii
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Bosch_GmbH 
iii
 http://support.youruk.net/uploadedpdfs/Bosch.pdf 
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In the case of the automobile industry Volkswagen AG, group is one of the 
world’s leading automobile manufacturers and the largest car producer in Europe. 
The second largest market behind Germany which VW is serving with a market 
share of more than 30% is China where its subsidiary, Volkswagen Group China 
is the largest foreign automaker. There are four areas of responsibility worldwide 
(European Union, North America, South America/South Africa, and Asia-Pacific 
region).    
 
 
   Source: http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/960/ 
 
It is obvious that the BRIC countries have 281 projects, the rest of 
locations have 210 projects. The distribution inside the BRIC states is also 
interesting. Thus 47% of the projects is in China. The remaining 53% is 
distributed across Brazil (12%), India (17%) and Russia (24%).  
In the case of the chemical industry BASF AG is one of the biggest 
German chemical companies in the world. With headquarters in Ludwigshafen am 
Rhein the BASF Group consists of more than 160 subsidiaries and joint ventures 
and operates production sites in 41 countries in Europe, Asia, North and South 
America.i  
In the 1960s the company expanded the production abroad and plants in 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, United Kingdom, India, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Spain and the United States. In 1965 the company changed its 
corporate strategy and focused on higher-value products such as coatings, 
                                                 
i
 See: http://www.corporate.basf.com/en/?id=V00-LjIlM7L_bbcp3TB 
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pharmaceuticals, crop protection agents and fertilizers. After the reunification, 
BASF acquired a site in Schwarzheide, East Germany, in 1990. 
In order to expand the international activities the company invested in its 
sites near Nanjing and Shanghai, China and other €5.6 billion in Asia between 
1990 and 2005. i Asia plays an important role for the company. As it expects that 
the Asian chemical markets (excluding Japan) will grow very strongly in the near 
future and will reach the size of the European chemical market by 2010. The 
average annual growth rate in the Asian chemical market will be 6% in next 10 
years, higher than the average annual growth rate of 3.4% in the world chemical 
market.ii  
In 2001 the worldwide sales revenue reached €32.5 billion. iii  In 2003, 
BASF sales were €33.4 billion. Its income from operations before special items 
was about €3 billion. At the end of 2003, 87,000 people were employed with over 
48,000 in Germany alone.iv 
BASF focus their resources on expanding selected businesses in specific 
regions. A crucial element of their strategy is building local production capacities 
in growth markets so that the company supplies regional markets locally. 
Consequently, the local production supports the increase of the company’s 
flexibility in high growth markets and the decline of risks produced by short-term 
currency fluctuations and weak regional growth. v BASF is active in a variety of 
markets. BASF has customers in over 170 countries and supplies about 8,000 
products to a wide variety of industries. BASF covers business in segments such 
as the chemicals, plastics, performance products, agricultural products and 
nutrition and oil and gas.vi 
Customers for the chemical business are the pharmaceutical, construction, 
textile and automotive industries. BASF as international leading producer of 
styrenics, sells engineering plastics to injection molders in a variety of industries. 
Customers for the performance chemicals are the automotive, oil, paper, 
packaging, textile, sanitary products, detergents, construction materials, coatings, 
printing and leather industries. BASF supplies the pharmaceutical, food and 
cosmetic industries with agricultural products and fine chemicals for agriculture 
and animal nutrition. BASF explores for and produces oil and gas through its 
subsidiary Wintershall AG which works with its Russian partner Gazprom in 
Central and Eastern Europe.vii 
The company concentrates its resources and uses growth potential in 
business which they have competitive advantages over other chemical producers 
in Europe and North America.viii By comparing BASF, Bayer and Hoechst, it can 
be said that BASF can be characterised by a stronger orientation towards primary 
                                                 
i
 See: http://berichte.basf.de/en/2002/jahresbericht/strategie/?id=DwfnS6nXxbir4-6 
ii
 See: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb048/is_200207/ai_hibm1G189971433 
iii
 See: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb048/is_200207/ai_hibm1G189971433 
iv
 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BASF 
v
 See: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb048/is_200207/ai_hibm1G189971433 
vi
 See: http://berichte.basf.de/en/2002/jahresbericht/strategie/?id=DwfnS6nXxbir4-6 
vii
 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BASF 
viii
 See:http://berichte.basf.de/en/2002/jahresbericht/strategie/?id=DwfnS6nXxbir4-6 
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and intermediate products (i.e. basic chemicals). The company has continuously 
adapted its production structure to changing needs instead shifting towards new 
long-term goals. BASF still operates within its existing core business areas (e.g. 
organic and inorganic chemicals, plastics and fibres, pigments and dyes, gas and 
oil) and continues to strengthen them.i  
 
6. Concluding Remarks    
 
We have demonstrated that historically German FDI has been focused in 
the European countries, and the US has been the second best location. As 
gradually but steadily, the new emerging BRIC markets become the dominant 
locations of economic activity and absorb massive FDI inflows it seems that the 
German multinationals have, initially, selected China as their primary location of 
activity. However there is a strong tendency that German FDI will mainly 
concentrate in Russia. If this occurs it will once again confirm the German 
preference for European destinations. However, this may be a very risky strategy, 
since in the long run both India and China have better prospects compared to 
those of Russia. Thus in the long run the competitors of German multinationals 
(MNEs) may possess a stronger position both in the above emerging markets, as 
well as in the international arena.        
Focusing primarily in Europe may be Germany’s gravest mistake. The EU 
itself is not an optimum currency area, as many economists have demonstrated.ii 
Furthermore, the rapid de-industrialization of the EU is associated with immense 
changes in the labour market. The EU becomes the region of the elderly. To 
illustrate, according to certain research by the year 2020 out of 1 billion 
individuals between 15-29 years of age, only 65 million will be located in Europe 
creating immense pressure in the social security systems, productivity levels etc.iii  
Focusing in Europe and preferring Russia as a primary location for FDI, 
compared to the other BRIC countries, may be a fatal blow for German industry 
compared to its rivals.     
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